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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides natural language requirements and associated formal 
specifications for an electric power grid. These specifications are the first step in using 
bounded constraint solving to detect early bleak states in an electric power grid system. 
We analyze several methods of software verification and validation including 
Theorem Proving, Model Checking, and Execution-based Model Checking before 
determining that Execution-based Model Checking is the most suitable for specifying 
properties of a power grid. The requirements and specifications are broken into four 
categories: undesirable events, downward trends, failure to recover, and undesirable 
fluctuations. All specifications are focused on system stability and reliability as indicated 
by system frequency and operating in a secure N-1 state. Specifications from three out of 
the four categories were tested to ensure they meet the spirit and letter of the natural 
language requirements while eliminating ambiguity inherent to natural languages. 
Finally, we show how a Hidden Markov Model can be used to perform run-time 
monitoring in the presence of hidden states, thereby enabling run-time monitoring of 
systems where monitored artifacts are not all perfectly visible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Mission-critical systems need to be highly dependable systems. Research has 
shown that formal specifications and formal methods help improve the clarity and 
precision of requirements specifications, which is a necessary ingredient of any highly 
dependable system. This thesis is focused on the analysis and validation of formal 
mission-critical requirements of an electric power grid system. 
We will concentrate on the development of formal specifications that allow 
runtime monitors to detect bleak states. A bleak state is a system state where no assertion 
has failed yet, and it is a state from which the system will inevitably violate one or more 
formal specifications [1]. Computational tree logic-based model checking techniques can 
detect the existence of a bleak state, but cannot detect whether the bleak state is early or 
late [1]. Early bleak states refer to bleak states that are several states or more removed 
from the formal specification violation. A SAT-solver based bounded constraint system, 
however, has the ability to detect and identify early bleak states. While this thesis does 
not conduct bounded constraint solving to detect bleak states in an electric power grid 
system, it provides formal specifications that can be used for such verification technique. 
We will analyze the power grid system requirements and express the critical runtime 
behavior using first-order logic. 
First, we identify observable operational setup and runtime patterns essential to 
the proper functioning of an electric power grid network system. Next, we generate 
natural language requirements based on the patterns and requirements identified. Once 
the natural language is specified, the requirements are formalized as statechart assertions, 
and converted into first order logic assertions. Scenario-based testing validates whether 
statechart assertions capture the intent of the natural language requirements [2]. 
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B. THE NEED FOR RUNTIME VERIFICATION IN MISSION-CRITICAL 
SYSTEMS 
Formal methods are known to improve software reliability and quality [3], [4]. 
Despite this and the positive development of formal methods over the years, acceptance 
and wide-spread use in industry and mission-critical systems has failed to materialize. 
Part of the research done in [5] identifies the multi-phase process of software 
development as a major reason for this. Never the less, formal methods of validation and 
verification, specifically execution-based model checking, have the ability to make an 
electric power grid system and other mission-critical systems more stable and reliable. 
The need for formal methods is identified in key findings, causes, and 
recommendations of power grid blackouts. The investigation of the blackout on 
September 8, 2011, in Arizona and Southern California conducted by the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) identified lack of planning and inadequate 
situational awareness as the two overarching causes of the blackout [6]. This thesis 
provides a methodology to addresses the issue of situational awareness by presenting 
formal specifications for execution-based model checking. Run-time monitoring provides 
stability and reliability by providing adequate real-time situational awareness of 
conditions, a quality lacking according the NERC’s findings. This topic is addressed 
again in Chapter III. 
C. REMAINING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II addresses the background information on formal validation and 
verification techniques and pertinent topics essential to understanding the methodology 
used in this thesis. Chapter III takes an in-depth look at an electric power grid system to 
identify parameters to utilize during run-time monitoring. Chapter IV defines the formal 
specifications created to monitor the stability of an electric power grid system. Chapter V 
describes the test suite used to validate the formal specifications provided in Chapter IV 
and discusses the results of running the formal specifications through the test suite. 
Section VI provides a proof of concept for utilizing a Hidden Markov Model to identify 
hidden data which can be used in behavioral and temporal pattern detection. Section VII 
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addresses future work regarding bounded constraint solving. Section VIII identifies 
shortcomings of this thesis and a conclusion. 
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5II. BACKGROUND
A. VISUAL TRADEOFF SPACE FOR FORMAL VERIFICATION AND 
VALIDATION TECHNIQUES 
At the most basic level, each verification and validation technique needs to 
address two questions in regards to the reactive systems they are used to monitor. The 
first question is “what does the software need to do?” Answering this question requires 
knowledge of a system’s functional requirements. Exploring the second question, “what 
must the software never do?” provides safe operational boundaries for a system. While 
traditional validation and verification techniques required a manual examination of 
requirements, modern program and system complexity have rendered manual 
examination insufficient and unfeasible. As a result we need to rely on automated 
validation and verification techniques to ensure system behaviors are correct. 
In the scope of software engineering, verification refers to means taken to ensure 
a product is built correctly. Validation is the effort to guarantee the right product is built 
for a specific purpose [7]. To address the implementation and use of formal validation 
and verification techniques to capture setup and runtime requirements of an electric 
power grid, we identified the technique best suited to the task. This was accomplished by 
using the visual tradeoff space in [5], which provides a framework and comparison of 
three prevalent formal validation and verification techniques. The three techniques 
analyzed are theorem proving, model checking, and execution-based model checking. 
The framework provided is called the formal validation and verification tradeoff cube as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. The tradeoff cube is comprised of the associated cost and 
coverage of each formal validation and verification technique. Factors contributing to the 
cost and coverage of each technique are the ability to specify complex properties, the 
effort required to create specifications of complex properties, and input effort required for 
software implementation. Cost refers to the financial cost required to generate 
and validate correct specifications [5]. 
In this section, we examine three validation and verification techniques, explain 
the makeup of the tradeoff cube, compare techniques using the tradeoff cube, and identify 
6the best technique to use for an electric power grid system. Each technique is evaluated in 
regards to cost and coverage space in three separate areas: specification/validation, 
program/implementation, and verification. 
Figure 1.  Cost Space 
Figure 2.  Coverage Space 
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1. Theorem Proving 
According to [5], theorem proving is a formal verification technique that makes a 
convincing argument that a program meets a formal requirement through the use of 
mathematical proofs. One important aspect of theorem proving in regards to cost and 
coverage is that it requires a human driver. Additionally, the required level of expertise 
for the driver depends on the specification language employed. A driver monitoring a 
specification in Propositional Linear-time Temporal Logic requires a higher level of 
expertise than a driver observing a specification in Propositional-Logic. Existing methods 
employing theorem proving formal methods are A Computational Logic for Applicative 
Common Lisp, the Stanford Temporal Prover, HOL4 (High Order Logic), Prototype 
Verification System, and Type systems to name a few [5]. 
Theorem proving’s specification dimension is dependent on the expressive power 
of the formal specification language chosen and subsequently how easy that language 
is to use. If a theorem prover is highly automated, it most likely has a restrictive, less 
expressive language. In general, theorem provers support relatively weak languages [5], 
cites this as the primary reason theorem proving techniques have low specification 
coverage with high specification cost. 
Another downside of theorem proving is its reliance on special programming 
languages. When it comes to program implementation, the inability of these languages to 
interface with applications using prominent high-level languages like Java or C++ leads 
to low coverage with high cost. From a verification standpoint, the presence of a 
knowledgeable user assures suitable coverage. The required presence of a knowledgeable 
user, however, causes verification cost to be high in this context. 
2. Model Checking 
According to [8], model checking algorithmically analyzes a program to prove 
certain properties hold true. Once model checking is set-up for a program, no human 
driver with expertise in the appropriate specification language is required. 
Model checking shares similar language limitations to theorem proving in the 
specification dimension. Both techniques have applications that use Propositional Linear-
 8
time Temporal Logic as their specification language. Additionally, both techniques are 
text-based, making system visualization difficult for designers. Other applications of 
model checking rely on computational tree logic which uses path operators, complicating 
the formation of correct specifications. As a result, model checking is weak in the 
specification dimension. While model checking also has high cost in the specification 
dimension, it has a lower cost than theorem proving because it does not require a highly 
skilled driver to complete a proof process. 
Model checking in the program/implementation dimension suffers from being 
limited to a finite-state component and the number of states in the component. This 
limitation results in the state-space explosion problem. According to [9], this 
phenomenon is when an increase in the number of processes leads to an exponential 
growth in the state space which model checking techniques conducting state enumeration 
cannot handle. The limited finite-state component comes from this. Additionally, the 
artifact used in the model checker is often not the same as the original system. Rather, it 
is a smaller segment or an abstraction of the overall system. This combined with the 
state-space explosion problem causes model checking to be weak and high cost in the 
program/implementation dimension. 
Model checking promotes automatic verification on command without a driver. It 
does this while providing full verification coverage for anything within its finite-state 
component. Thus, model checking is strong and has low cost in the verification coverage 
dimension. 
3. Execution-Based Model Checking 
Execution-based model checking is divided into two separate parts: runtime 
verification and automatic test generation. Run-time verification refers to methods used 
to monitor a system or application and comparing its current behavior to formal 
specifications representing correct system behavior [5]. A high volume of automatically 
generated tests, used in conjunction with run-time verification of formal specifications, 
yields execution-based model checking. 
 9
While many runtime-verification tools utilize Propositional Linear-time Temporal 
Logic or Model Transformation Language as their specification language, many modern 
tools use more powerful, expressive, and easy to use languages such as StateRover’s 
specification language and UML diagrams, which are the current state-of-practice. The 
availability and use of these languages allows execution-based model checking to be 
relatively powerful with low cost in the specification dimension. 
Another advantage of run-time verification is that it is designed to be used with 
systems regardless of their size, complexity, or programing language used to create them. 
Because of this, execution-based model checking has high coverage and low cost in the 
program/application dimension. One weakness is that execution-based model checking 
relies on automatic test generation. This weakness materializes in the verification 
dimension. When the system under test and specification run concurrently, we cannot be 
assured the automatic test generator will generate a test that violates a requirement which 
means there cannot be full verification coverage. This causes execution-based model 
checking to be weaker in verification coverage than theorem proving or model checking. 
The more automated the automatic test generation tool is, the lower the cost in the 
verification dimension. 
4. Best FV&V Technique for an Electrical Power Grid System 
After weighing the three options available, execution-based model checking was 
selected as the most appropriate option for conducting formal validation and verification 
for an electric power grid for the following reasons: 
 UML-statechart assertions allow for the visualization and easy 
implementation of mission and safety-critical requirements. 
 Several specifications for electric power grids require monitoring time-
series data. The specification dimension of coverage (Figure 2) indicates 
that both theorem proving and model checking using Propositional Linear-
time Logic, their most expressive language, has a difficult time handling 
timing and time-series data. UML-statechart assertions, however, provide 
specification coverage in this area. 
 An analysis of data monitored by a power grid requires high 
implementation coverage with low implementation cost. Execution-based 
model checking outperforms the other two techniques in this requirement. 
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 Despite having lower coverage in the verification dimension, the purpose 
of this thesis is to provide formal specifications for an electric power grid 
to be used to conduct bounded constraint solving to identify bleak states. 
The implementation of bounded constraint solving will improve coverage 
in the verification dimension while realizing the low cost and high 
coverage of execution-based model checking in other dimensions. 
B. PATTERNS FOR TESTING FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS 
An obstacle to converting from natural language to a formal specification is 
ambiguity. Natural language by definition has an element of vagueness making exact 
specification difficult and preventing computers from effectively analyzing it [10]. 
Formal specifications must capture the precise intent of the natural language requirement. 
[11] presents baseline patterns to consider when testing formal specifications. These 
patterns serve to validate a formal specification, making sure it does exactly what it 
means to do. A second benefit of these test scenarios is to ensure that the formal 
specification captures the intent of the natural language requirement. 
The intent of a natural language requirement needs to be clear. To illustrate this, 
we convert one of our natural language requirements defined in Chapter IV into two 
different formal specifications. NL1 is the natural language requirement: 
NL1. Flag when frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz for four minutes in a five 
minute period. 
R1 and R2 are different formal specifications that represent a legitimate 
interpretation of NL1: 
R1: Flag whenever more than N events E occur within one of a series of consecutive T 
intervals. N = 3, E= frequency <= 59.7, T = 5. 
R2: Flag whenever more than N events E occur within one of a series of semi-consecutive 
intervals T. N = 3, E= frequency <= 59.7, T = 5. 
Figure 3 provides an example event time-line to evaluate R1 and R2. By 
observing the sequence it is clear that from event E at minute four through event E at 
minute seven, there are four instances of event E within a five-minute period. While R1 
and R2 are legitimate interpretations of NL1, only R2 will flag at minute seven. The 
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counter in R1 resets after each five-minute interval, preventing it from identifying an 
instance of four consecutive E’s, an instance NL1 seeks to identify. If an event that 
occurred every five minutes existed that would warrant resetting the counter, R1 would 
be the desired rule. However, the intent of NL1 is such that R2 does a better job of 
fulfilling it than R1 as demonstrated through an analysis of Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Event time-line for evaluating R1 and R2 
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III. ELECTRIC POWER GRID 
A. GETTING A GRIP ON THE POWER GRID 
Before we discuss our formal specifications, we need a baseline understanding 
about power grids. More specifically, we need to understand the system’s major 
components, how it operates, important values, metrics used to monitor it, and means for 
identifying and correcting undesired events. 
The power grids of today are the largest engineered systems ever built. They are 
relied upon to deliver power on demand to the population of their respected areas. For the 
purpose of this thesis, we discuss the design and properties of the North American power 
grid which differs from other designs on several fronts to include evolution and selection 
of a single frequency. Alternating current is generally more desirable than direct current 
in regards to power grids because of inherit energy savings and because materials for 
alternating current are more conducive to transform between low voltage and high 
voltage [12]. Low voltage is used for consumption while high voltage enables long 
distance power transmission with low energy loss. 
North America’s bottom-up approach to power grid development focused on 
regionally strong grids connected by weaker links to nearby regions [12]. Our current 
U.S. transmission grid is a network of regional and local power authorities. The U.S. 
power grid as of 2009 consists of three independent regions. Each independent region is 
considered a large power grid network. These networks consist of two different types of 
networks: large-scale transmission grids and distribution grids. There is typically one 
transmission grid with numerous distributions grids, each covering a small area. 
The transmission grid is a highly meshed network comprised of high-voltage  
(100 to 1,000kV) power lines. A standard transmission grid line is about 100 kilometers 
and the average node in a transmission grid has 2.5 line connections, which provides a 
level of resiliency to the system [12]. Centralized generating stations feed into the 
transmission grid producing 500 to 5000 MW of power. The transmission grid transports 
this power to substations that convert the power to a lower voltage for distribution to 
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customers. Substations mark the point where the transmission grid ends and distribution 
grids begin. Once the substation converts power from the transmission grid to 
approximately 10 to 30kV, distribution grids consisting of short, tree-like circuits carry 
the power the remainder of the way to customers.  
Despite transporting voltage differing in orders of magnitude, transmission and 
distribution grids follow the same guidelines with respect to physics. The power carried 
across power lines is an oscillating electric current that is either real power or reactive 
power. The electric current produces real power when it is in phase with the oscillating 
voltage. Real power does useful work while reactive power, when current is ninety 
degrees out of phase with voltage, affects oscillating voltage throughout the network and 
does no useful work [12]. Despite this, electrical loads always use real power and in most 
circumstances use reactive power as well. Steady state of a system is achieved when 
power injection from generators, electric loads, and line loss are in balance. As loads 
change, power fluctuates between types, generators fail, or transmission lines fail, kinetic 
energy can be lost. When kinetic energy is lost, generators decelerate, which leads to a 
deviation in grid frequency. The more severe the loss in kinetic energy, the greater the 
deviation in grid frequency. 
One of the most critical aspects about the North American power grid is its 
maintenance of a single frequency. The need for a single frequency is a result of the use 
of synchronized alternating current interconnections. While European nations chose 
50 Hz, North Americans chose 60 Hz, which continues to be our standard [12]. 
1. Reliability 
In a perfect world, transmission grids would maintain a constant 60 Hz with no 
deviations regardless of the load. In practice, however, equipment failure, transmission 
line resistance, fluctuations in power generated by renewable energy sources, and 
inherent delays in a generator’s ability to adjust to changing power demands prevent a 
constant 60 Hz from being achieved [12]. Deviation from 60 Hz is inherent in the system 
and does not need to be zero but all efforts need to be taken to ensure the deviation is as 
small as possible. Smaller deviations are the result of line resistance and generators 
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adjusting to changing demand, while equipment failure and renewable energy source 
power fluctuations account for larger deviations. The primary gauge of reliability in a 
power grid system is the system frequency. System reserves are specifically saved to 
stabilize system frequency in the event of larger deviations. If system reserves are not 
used quickly enough or are not available when system frequency reaches a certain 
threshold, the undesirable response of Under-Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) is 
triggered to aid the return to a steady state. For this reason, system frequency is a 
monitored value that must be evaluated against formal specifications for an accurate 
assessment of the reliability of an electric power grid. 
2. Stability 
The power grid assesses reliability and stability as often as every five minutes. In 
addition to monitoring system frequency, reliability and stability are measured against 
three standards: N-1 feasibility, transient stability, and voltage stability [11]. The system 
is considered to be in a feasible N-1 state when there is an achievable steady-state 
solution in the event that a generator or transmission line fails [13]. On hand reserves 
play the biggest role in identifying if a steady-state solution is achievable. If system 
reserves are not sufficient, the power grid cannot proactively initiate the return to a 
steady-state. As will be established in the evaluation of the September 8, 2011, blackout 
in Section B of this chapter, the minimum amount of reserves a system is required to 
maintain is equivalent to the amount of power needed to reach a steady state if the largest 
generator is taken out of the system. If reserves meet this requirement, the system is 
considered in a feasible N-1 state. 
The measure of a system’s ability to reach the N-1 feasibility steady state solution 
is known as transient stability [12]. Voltage stability ensures that the steady-state solution 
is sufficient to withstand changes in electrical loading. These criteria ensure that a steady-
state solution exists, that it is attainable, and once reached it can be maintained if all  
else remains equal. As the power grid evolves and increases in complexity, these metrics 
may fall short of providing a stable and reliable system. Until they are deemed obsolete 
and more suitable metrics are created to deal with changes, these metrics continue to 
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serve the power grids of today and will for some time. This thesis uses formal 
specifications of system frequency and the N-1 feasibility contingency because they are 
essential to the proper operation of the power grid and are the easiest on which to 
maintain accurate measurements. 
B. ARIZONA-SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SEPTEMBER 8, 2011, 
BLACKOUT 
Despite the existence of sophisticated controls, power grid blackouts occur 
regularly and in increasing numbers. While the number of blackouts for the North 
American power grid averaged seven per year until 1995, increasing system complexities 
and other factors caused this value to increase to 36 per year starting in 2006 [14]. This 
section focuses on the findings of one of the larger and more catastrophic instances of 
power grid failure in recent years. The findings identify the need for more robust 
monitoring and provide important metrics to monitor. 
An 11-minute disturbance caused cascading outages in the Pacific Southwest and 
left around 2.7 million customers without power on September 8, 2011 [6]. The extent of 
the damage increases considerably when taking into account the traffic lights, schools, 
businesses, water and sewage pumping stations, and transportation effected by the 
outages. While not the sole cause of the outage, it was initiated by the loss of one 500 kV 
transmission line[6]. This line went down multiple times in the past without causing 
outages indicating the presence of other contributing conditions. When flows 
redistributed to account for the transmission line loss they caused voltage deviations and 
overloads on transformers, transmission lines, and generators leading to overall load 
shedding. 
The first and foremost finding was that the system was not being operated in a 
secure N-1 state. This indicates a failure to meet the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation’s (NERC) mandatory reliability standards requiring the Bulk Electric System 
(BES) to remain in a reliable condition in the event a single contingency occurs. Loss of a 
generator, transformer, or transmission line is an example of such a contingency. 
Possessing the required reserves and functioning infrastructure to maintain stability in the 
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presence of a single contingency indicates being in a secure N-1 state [6]. Proper N-1 
contingency planning ensures that a system can anticipate possible contingencies, adopt 
measures to maintain stability, and have available resources on hand to keep the system 
in equilibrium. The failure to operate in a secure N-1 state stems from inadequate 
operations planning and lack of real-time situational awareness. These are reoccurring 
causes in many power grid failures. 
C. SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT FEBRUARY 1–5, 2011 
The cold weather event from February 1–5, 2011, caused 3.2 million Electric 
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) customers to lose power. In contrast to root causes 
from the Arizona-Southern California blackout, ERCOT’s system was operating in a 
secure N-1 state and under-frequency load shedding was conducted effectively, 
preventing a more catastrophic event from taking place. While internal problems were 
not the primary issue, a cold weather storm caused 193 ERCOT generating units to fail or 
operate at less than optimal levels over the course of the day on February 1, 2011 [15]. 
The 193 generation units accounted for a total loss of 29,729 MW out of an estimated 
daily load capacity of 52,673 MW. The loss in generators overwhelmed reserves, forcing 
ERCOT to execute 4,000 MW of controlled load shedding [15]. While any system can be 
improved and is susceptible in some degree to outside threats, the planning and 
contingency values adhered to by ERCOT minimized the damage caused by the arctic 
cold front during this week. Thus, many formal specifications presented in this thesis 
correspond to parameters and values identified by ERCOT for the stable running of their 
power grid. Effective run-time verification tools such as formal specifications provide a 
greater chance for losses to be mitigated in the future. 
1. N-1 and N-2 Contingency Values 
An important aspect of ensuring an effective N-1 state is to maintain the proper 
reserves. Responsive reserves are referred to as the Physical Response Capability (PRC). 
NERC’s Reliability Standard BAL-002–0 R3 requires the balancing authority, in this 
instance ERCOT, to maintain a PRC to cover the loss of the largest contingency in the 
system [15]. The purpose of the PRC is to provide the system with responsive means of 
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restoring system frequency to 60 Hz in the event of abnormal frequency deviation. NERC 
minimum PRC level for safe operation of the system is the N-1 contingency reserve 
level. ERCOT’s N-1 contingency reserve level was set at 1354 MW, the rating of their 
nuclear-powered generating unit [15].  
As an added layer of protection and to account for ERCOT not being 
synchronously linked with other interconnections, they maintain a larger reserve than is 
required. The larger reserve calculated by ERCOT as their N-2 contingency is 2300 MW. 
This means that 2300 MW is the PRC required to prevent load shedding to maintain 
system frequency at 60 Hz in the event that ERCOT’s system simultaneously loses its 
two largest generation sources [15]. Ideally, PRC will never fall below 2300 MW. Actual 
PRC typically surpasses 2300 MW. In fact, going into the first set of outages, PRC was 
3100 MW. Despite being well above required reserves, 3100 MW was not sufficient to 
account for the 29,729 MW loss in generation capacity caused by weather. 
2. Frequency and Load Shedding Values 
While system frequency and PRC are separately monitored values, they are 
inherently tied together. System frequency maintains itself around 60 Hz. When 
frequency falls to 59.7 Hz or lower, however, it is considered a large deviation and 
reserves must be used to contain and restore the system back to 60 Hz. This is imperative 
because if system frequency reaches 59.3 Hz or lower, the first block of automatic under-
frequency load shedding is automatically triggered [15]. The first block will conduct a 
controlled dump of five percent of the total load on the system. If the PRC is at 
inadequate levels, the system loses its responsive capability to prevent load shedding at 
59.3 Hz. The 4000 MW of load shedding during the cold weather event occurred 
specifically because of this reason. 
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IV. FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS 
Using the information gathered from Chapter III, we can generate our formal 
specifications. We define each specification first as a natural language requirement then 
convert the natural language requirement into a UML-statechart assertion using generic 
assertions provided at [16]. Our specifications are broken into four separate categories: 
undesirable events, downward trends, failure to recover, and undesirable fluctuations. 
While the specifications cover several vital aspects of a properly functioning power grid, 
they are not a comprehensive list of every aspect of the power grid. Instead, they show 
essential properties of an electric power grid can be expressed and evaluated using the 
state of practice for run-time verification in software engineering. For the purposes of 
clarity, we used the PRC contingency values and frequency guidelines as provided by 
ERCOT in [15]. Every system has equivalent values which can be used to make the 
provided specifications apply. 
A. NATURAL LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ELECTRIC 
POWER GRID 
Natural language requirements lay the groundwork for conversion to less 
ambiguous assertions. The following specifications are broken into four categories: 
undesirable events, downward trends, failure to recover, and undesirable fluctuations. 
1. Undesirable Events 
Undesirable events are the most simplistic rules that focus on one instance where 
values reach levels they should not be at. If one of these rules is flagged it does not 
necessarily mean that other specifications will flag. However, if specifications in other 
categories flag, there is a high probability one or several of natural language requirements 
in this category have been flagged. These are the base rules compound specifications are 
built from. Rules 5–8 in this section are focused around the relationship between PRC 
and frequency. Reserves measured by the PRC are used to restore system frequency to 
60 Hz when it falls to or below 59.7 Hz. It is essential for operators to know when the 
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PRC is below N-2 criterion and frequency reaches a point when reserves are required, 
thus reserves are required but not available. 
The primary purpose of creating natural language requirements and formal 
specifications of a power grid is to use them in bounded constraint solving to detect  
bleak states. However, this is not the sole purpose of creating them. In addition to 
conducting formal verification, run-time monitoring of formal specifications is used for 
informational purposes. In several cases of presented requirements, one requirement is a 
stronger version of another. For example, natural language requirement 4 is a stronger 
version of natural language requirement 3. Thus, if natural language requirement 4 flags, 
we also know that natural language requirement 3 has been flagged.  
If our sole intent was to create requirements to detect bleak states, we would only 
need natural language requirement 4. Natural language requirement 3, however, serves as 
an early warning indicator for natural language requirement 4. The system and its 
operators need to be aware when system frequency hits 59.7 Hz so steps can be taken to 
prevent frequency from falling to 59.3 Hz where under-frequency load shedding is 
triggered. Without natural language requirement 3, early warning and preventive steps to 
stabilize system frequency will fail to occur responsively. Additionally, in most cases 
when natural language requirement 3 flags, natural language requirement 4 does not. 
1. Flag when PRC is less than 2300 MW (N-2 criterion). 
2. Flag when PRC is less than 1354 MW (N-1 criterion). 
3. Flag when system frequency falls to 59.7 Hz or lower. 
4. Flag when system frequency falls to 59.3 Hz or lower. 
5. Flag when PRC is less than 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and system 
frequency is 59.7 Hz or lower. 
6. Flag when PRC is less than 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and system 
frequency is 59.3 Hz or lower. 
7. Flag when PRC is less than 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) and system 
frequency is 59.7 Hz or lower. 
8. Flag when PRC is less than 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) and system 
frequency is 59.3 Hz or lower. 
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2. Downward Trends 
The downward trend category identifies the violation of a less severe threshold 
followed by the violation of a more extreme threshold. This event shows the undesirable 
downward trend of a particular value. Note that the more severe frequency threshold 
below is set to 59.5 Hz instead of 59.3 Hz. This is because once frequency 59.3 is met, 
automatic load shedding is conducted. The reason for identifying the downward trend is 
to identify it and prevent it from continuing to 59.3 Hz. That is why the second threshold 
used is 59.5 Hz. 
9. Flag when PRC falls below 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and subsequently 
falls below 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) within 30 minutes. 
10. Flag when PRC falls below 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and subsequently 
falls below 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) within 15 minutes. 
11. Flag when system frequency falls to 59.7 Hz or below and subsequently 
falls to 59.5 Hz or below within 30 minutes. 
12. Flag when system frequency falls to 59.7 Hz or below and subsequently 
falls to 59.5 Hz or below within 15 minutes. 
3. Failure to Recover 
Findings from the blackout identified one of their shortcomings as a failure to 
restore the system to a secure N-1 state. NERC continued to write that a secure N-1 state 
must be restored as quickly as possible but should not take longer to achieve than 
30 minutes [6]. This category addresses the 30 minute requirement for both the N-1 and 
N-2 criteria monitored by ERCOT while creating an intermediate requirement of 
15 minutes to provide early warning. Additionally, specifications addressing a system’s 
failure to restore frequency are also included. 
13. Flag when PRC falls below 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and is not restored 
to 2300 MW or greater in 30 minutes. 
14. Flag when PRC falls below 2300 MW (N-2 criterion) and is not restored 
to 2300 MW or greater in 15 minutes. 
15. Flag when PRC falls below 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) and is not restored 
to 1354 MW or greater in 30 minutes. 
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16. Flag when PRC falls below 1354 MW (N-1 criterion) and is not restored 
to 1354 MW or greater in 15 minutes. 
17. Flag when frequency reaches 59.7 Hz or below and is not restored to 
greater than 59.7 in 15 minutes. 
4. Undesirable Fluctuations 
Findings in both the September and February blackouts indicate that falling in and 
out of stable N-1, N-2, and frequency states indicated the system was having difficulty 
reaching lasting equilibrium. This category is designed to identify a potential situation 
when this is the case. 
18. Flag when PRC is less than 2300 MW for four minutes (or more) in a 
5 minute period. 
19. Flag when PRC is less than 2300 MW for eight minutes (or more) in a 
15 minute period. 
20. Flag when PRC is less than 1354 MW for four minutes (or more) in a 
5 minute period. 
21. Flag when PRC is less than 1354 MW for eight minutes (or more) in a 
15 minute period. 
22. Flag when frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz for four minutes in a 
5 minute period. 
23. Flag when frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz for eight minutes in a 
15 minute period. 
24. Flag when frequency is less than or equal to 59.3 Hz for four minutes in a 
5 minute period. 
25. Flag when frequency is less than or equal to 59.3 Hz for eight minutes in a 
15 minute period. 
B. FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR AN ELECTRIC POWER GRID 
The following formal specifications are the UML-statechart interpretations of the 
natural language requirements in the previous section. 
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1. Undesirable Events 
To convert the natural language requirements for this category, we used Rule 1 
from [16].  
Rule 1: Flag whenever event P happens. Figure 4 denotes the UML-statechart for 
Rule 1. 
 
Figure 4.  Rule 1 UML-statechart (from [16]). 
We conform Rule 1 to our natural language requirements by creating formal 
specifications with the following assignments: 
1. P = PRC<2300 MW 
2. P = PRC<1354 MW 
3. P = frequency<=59.7 Hz 
4. P = frequency<=59.3 Hz 
5. P = PRC<2300 MW ^ frequency<=59.7 Hz 
6. P = PRC<2300 MW ^ frequency<=59.3 Hz 
7. P = PRC<1354 MW ^ frequency<=59.7 Hz 
8. P = PRC<1354 MW ^ frequency<=59.3 Hz 
2. Downward Trends 
To convert the natural language requirements for this category, we used Rule 11 
from [16].  
Rule 11: Flag whenever event P with eventual event Q within time T after P. 
Figure 5 denotes the UML-statechart for Rule 11. 
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Figure 5.  Rule 11 UML-statechart (from [16]). 
We conform Rule 11 to our natural language requirements by creating formal 
specifications with the following assignments: 
9. P = PRC<2300 MW, Q = PRC<1354 MW, T = 30 minutes 
10. P = PRC<2300 MW, Q = PRC<1354 MW, T = 15 minutes 
11. P = frequency<=59.7 Hz, Q = frequency<=59.5 Hz, T = 30 minutes 
12. P = frequency<=59.7 Hz, Q = frequency<=59.5 Hz, T = 15 minutes 
3. Failure to Recover 
To convert the natural language requirements for this category, we used Rule 12 
from [16].  
Rule 12: Flag whenever event P with no eventual event Q within time T after P. 
Figure 6 denotes the UML-statechart for Rule 12. 
We conform Rule 12 to our natural language requirements by creating formal 
specifications with the following assignments: 
13. P = PRC<2300 MW, Q = PRC<=2300 MW, T = 30 minutes 
14. P = PRC<2300 MW, Q = PRC<=2300 MW, T = 15 minutes 
15. P = PRC<1354 MW, Q = PRC<=1354 MW, T = 30 minutes 
16. P = PRC<1354 MW, Q = PRC<=1354 MW, T = 15 minutes 
17. P = frequency<=59.7 Hz, Q = frequency<=59.7 Hz, T = 15 minutes 
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Figure 6.  Rule 12 UML-statechart (from [16]). 
4. Undesirable Fluctuations 
To convert the natural language requirements for this category, we used Rule 28 
from [16].  
Rule 28: Flag whenever more than N events E occur within one of a series of semi 
consecutive intervals T. Figure 7 denotes the UML-statechart for Rule 28. 
 
Figure 7.  Rule 28 UML-statechart (from [16]). 
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We conform Rule 28 to our natural language requirements by creating formal 
specifications with the following assignments: 
18. E = PRC<2300 MW, N = 3, T = 5 minutes 
19. E = PRC<2300 MW, N = 7, T = 15 minutes 
20. E = PRC<1354 MW, N = 3, T = 5 minutes 
21. E = PRC<1354 MW, N = 7, T = 15 minutes 
22. E = frequency<=59.7 Hz, N = 3, T = 5 minutes 
23. E = frequency<=59.7 Hz, N = 7, T = 15 minutes 
24. E = frequency<=59.3 Hz, N = 3, T = 5 minutes 
25. E = frequency<=59.3 Hz, N = 7, T = 15 minutes 
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V. TESTING AND RESULTS 
The next step to ensure our formal specifications are valid is to test them to see if 
they meet the spirit and letter of their associated natural language requirement. If the 
specifications achieve the spirit and letter then they are not only valid specifications but 
they have eliminated any ambiguity associated with the natural language requirement. 
We use [11] for guidance on test scenarios to accomplish this. We chose three compound 
specifications from different categories to execute test scenarios on. We conduct 
validation on specifications 5, 17, and 22. 
A. SPECIFICATION 5 
Recall that this specification identifies when PRC falls below 2300 MW and 
frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz. To validate this specification we conducted 
five separate tests: obvious success, obvious failure, PRC is below 2300 MW but 
frequency is greater than 59.7 Hz, PRC is greater than or equal to 2300 MW but 
frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz, and alternating between instances where PRC 
is below 2300 MW and frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz. Time intervals do not 
come into play with this specification. 
Obvious success is a scenario where we expect our specification to flag. Obvious 
failure is a scenario where we do not expect our specification to flag. To separate the 
obvious failure from subsequent tests we expect to fail, the data used for obvious failure 
does not contain a single instance where PRC is below 2300 MW or frequency is less 
than or equal to 59.7 Hz. Table 1 contains the pertinent data used for our obvious success 
test which is validated in execution down to the line number in Figure 8. The remaining 
four tests all failed to flag as expected. 
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Figure 8.  Obvious success flag for specification 5. 
Table 1.   Obvious success data for specification 5. 
Line 
No. Time Frequency PRC 
7 2015–02–25 08:7:00 59.938166 2510 
8 2015–02–25 08:8:00 60.07442204 2382 
9 2015–02–25 08:9:00 59.63535852 2032 
10 2015–02–25 08:10:00 59.84052206 2337 
 
B. SPECIFICATION 17 
Remember that this specification evaluates whether system frequency recovers 
from frequency dropping to 59.7 or less within 15 minutes. Specification 17 aligns with 
several test scenarios provided in [11]. Thus, to validate specification 17 we conducted 
five separate tests: obvious success, obvious failure, event repetitions, and two sets of 
multiple time intervals. The one instance of multiple time intervals will flag after the first 
time interval while the other will flag after the second time interval. Success in validating 
this specification and eliminating ambiguity from its natural language requirement is 
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defined by a flag from the obvious success test and a single flag from both the multiple 
time interval tests. 
Table 2 contains the pertinent data used for our obvious success test which is 
validated in Figure 9. Figure 10 shows the validation of the first multiple time interval 
test. The second multiple time interval test flagged as expected while the obvious failure 
and event repetition tests failed to flag as expected. 
Table 2.   Obvious success data for specification 17. 
Line No. Time Frequency PRC 
8 2015–02–25 08:8:00 59.94136873 2550 
9 2015–02–25 08:9:00 59.67921992 2490 
10 2015–02–25 08:10:00 59.53028543 2438 
11 2015–02–25 08:11:00 59.58969469 2420 
12 2015–02–25 08:12:00 59.51353884 2345 
13 2015–02–25 08:13:00 59.52348766 2513 
14 2015–02–25 08:14:00 59.65914203 2418 
15 2015–02–25 08:15:00 59.60677562 2449 
16 2015–02–25 08:16:00 59.60178063 2406 
17 2015–02–25 08:17:00 59.6808579 2303 
18 2015–02–25 08:18:00 59.54540228 2540 
19 2015–02–25 08:19:00 59.60511856 2416 
20 2015–02–25 08:20:00 59.64173015 2490 
21 2015–02–25 08:21:00 59.65411407 2435 
22 2015–02–25 08:22:00 59.68877361 2479 
23 2015–02–25 08:23:00 59.66904535 2558 
24 2015–02–25 08:24:00 59.60590629 2477 
25 2015–02–25 08:25:00 60.06379443 2450 
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Figure 9.  Obvious success flag for specification 17. 
 
Figure 10.  Multiple time intervals flag for specification 17. 
C. SPECIFICATION 22 
In Chapter II, we discussed the ambiguity associated with specification 22: Flag 
when frequency is less than or equal to 59.7 Hz for four minutes in a five-minute period. 
We also expressed that R2 did a better job that R1 of fulfilling the natural language 
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requirement. To validate that statement, we conducted the following five tests on the 
formal specification: obvious success, obvious failure, and three instances of multiple 
time intervals where we expect the first instance to flag once, the second instance to flag 
twice, and the third instance to flag three times. 
Table 3 contains data equivalent to the timing shown in Figure 3 from Chapter II 
while Figure 11 shows run-time execution of the data and where it expectedly flags once. 
Obvious failure did not flag and the remaining instances of multiple time intervals 
flagged as expected, thus validating our assertion. 
Table 3.   Multiple time interval data for specification 22. 
Line No. Time Frequency PRC 
1 2015–02–25 08:0:00 60.04426419 2346 
2 2015–02–25 08:1:00 59.69104352 2344 
3 2015–02–25 08:2:00 60.19712239 2461 
4 2015–02–25 08:3:00 59.54800324 2434 
5 2015–02–25 08:4:00 59.51057456 2343 
6 2015–02–25 08:5:00 59.61708826 2367 
7 2015–02–25 08:6:00 59.61302657 2495 
8 2015–02–25 08:7:00 60.15421913 2440 
 
Figure 11.  Multiple time intervals flag for specification 22. 
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VI. HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a technique for the detection of behavioral and temporal 
patterns in data generated by an electric power grid with only partially necessary data in 
evidence.  
At a minimum, an electric power grid is monitored by visible measurable data to 
include the date time, system frequency, and PRC. Fluctuations in system frequency and 
PRC are inherent within reasonable limits but larger changes are the result of any number 
of events and can indicate internal or external issues in the system. The nature of larger 
fluctuations, whether the loss of a large generator, the downing of a transmission line, or 
inherent variable energy flow from a renewable resource, is not explicitly available.  
A well-known technique for behavioral pattern detection is the Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) technique to learn and identify hidden artifacts. The HMM technique used 
in conjunction with probabilistic UML-based formal specifications at run-time provides 
us with a technique to conduct behavioral pattern detection and thus get data not 
inherently available. This system requires the end user to conduct a learning phase based 
off the system’s deterministic patterns which is used to identify hidden artifacts in those 
patterns. Frequency and transition analysis of the identified artifacts provide the state set 
for the HMM. During run-time, monitored data is used by the HMM to identify hidden 
data. Once identified, the hidden data is used for probabilistic pattern detection and run 
against existing formal specifications. 
HMM are state machines where transitions between states and a state outputs are 
probabilistic in nature. With this in mind, we generate a HMM by learning system states 
and their transitions [17]. Once created the HMM uses known data to identify a hidden 
system state and its sequences. This model does not use the probability of an observable 
sequence of states, rather it provides the probability of the system being in a particular 
state as the result of a series of observable data. 
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Run-time Verification refers to methods used to monitor a system or application 
and its behaviors by comparing current behavior to identified correct behavior specified 
by formal specifications [17]. The use of formal specifications ensures that during run-
time, a system is operating within its intended bounds while providing a flag to identify 
deviation from normal and specify where the disturbance takes place to enable remedial 
actions. 
We use the hybrid pattern detection technique proposed in [17]. The hybrid 
technique combines statistical pattern detection with formal specification and RV 
techniques. This technique is used to identify hidden states in an electric power grid and 
use the identification of these states to conduct RV based off an arbitrary formal 
specification. Section B of this chapter includes a formal specification for an electric 
power grid’s hidden state, an explanation of the learning phase conducted to generate the 
HMM, the resulting HMM matrices and their implementation, and an explanation of run-
time analysis of system state as generated by the HMM in regards to our presented 
specification. 
B. MODEL GENERATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND USE 
This section discusses the hidden data states, a formal specification about one of 
these states, the learning process, the HMM, and how these factors fit together to enhance 
our ability to conduct RV of an electric power grid system. The goal of this system is to 
input a spreadsheet containing known data to a program executing the HMM, the 
program generating a “State” column to the spreadsheet, then running the spreadsheet 
against the provided formal specification to see if it flags. Unfortunately, running the 
HMM requires a code generator we do not have access to. Consequently, we generate the 
HMM parameters, explain the execution flow of conducting pattern matching for the 
transaction log and subsequently conducting RV with a formal specification, but we do 
not execute these actions. 
1. Formal Specification for an Electric Power Grid’s Hidden State 
Known data such as date, time, system frequency, and PRC are integral values to 
monitor for an electric power grid. In earlier chapters, we generated formal specifications 
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that will facilitate RV of a system that is monitoring these values. As previously 
mentioned, small fluctuations in system frequency are inherent but larger fluctuations can 
be attributed to certain events that place the power grid in a specific state which is 
unobserved during run-time. Using changes in the system frequency and other knowledge 
of the power grid, we can identify hidden states that indicate healthy or detrimental run-
time behavior. Four states are identified and used in this chapter: Steady State (S), Loss 
of a Generator (G), Transmission Line Down (T), and Variable Energy Flow from a 
Renewable Resource (R). Changes in system frequency can be directly tied to these states 
or events. If the change in system frequency is severe enough, system reserves 
represented by the PRC need to be used to meet a state of equilibrium. The state of this 
equilibrium is identified by S. Equilibrium takes into account minor, unavoidable 
fluctuations in system frequency. 
As the worst case of our hidden states, power grid system state G, Loss of a 
Generator, will be the focus of our formal specification. The following is a sample natural 
language requirement about state G; if a situation conforms to this specification, it is 
considered to be flagged: Flag when the system is in state G for more than 3 minutes in a 
semi-consecutive 5 minute interval. To convert this NL specification to a UML statechart 
assertion, we utilized software provided at [16]. Rule 28 on the site conformed to our rule 
and was utilized to generate our assertion. 
Rule 28: Flag whenever more than N events E occur within one of a series of semi 
consecutive intervals T. Figure 7 depicts the generic UML statechart for our rule. This 
rule is customized to our purposes by making the following assignments: 
26. N = 3, E = State == G, T = 5 minutes. 
Once we identify system state, we can conduct RV against this specification. 
2. Learning Phase 
In contrast to a machine learning (ML) approach, the learning phase in our 
method requires manual input from a user who can identify which of the four states the 
power grid system is in by line of data. One shortfall of this approach is that it is time 
consuming and does not generate the volume of data a ML approach can. Despite this, it 
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makes up for it with accuracy and being able to provide information a machine cannot. 
To generate our HMM, we used a spreadsheet accounting for a seven-day period. For a 
system recording data every minute on the minute, this provided 10,080 samples of 
hidden states and state transitions. Table 4 depicts a sample of learning phase data. The 
learning phase consisted of manually generating the “State” column of the spreadsheet. 
For the purposes of conducting a proof of concept, a small sample size was suitable. For a 
usable implementation, more data is required in this phase to achieve the most accurate 
HMM possible. 
Table 4.   Learning Phase. 
Time Frequency PRC State 
08:05:00 59.680 2318 S 
08:06:00 59.825 2401 S 
08:07:00 60.074 2557 S 
08:08:00 59.839 2474 R 
08:09:00 59.431 2310 T 
 
3. Hidden Markov Model 
The learning phase determines the HMM parameters needed to conduct the 
pattern matching architecture for the transition log and formal specification. The HMM 
parameters are the set of states, an observable tuple describing potential data 
combinations, Matrix A, Matrix B, and initial state distribution [17]. The set of states are 
the four states previously mentioned: S, G, T, and R. The observable tuple, O, is a 
conjunction of frequency state and PRC state both represented as integers. Frequency is 
the first value in the tuple and PRC is the second. Table 5 shows frequency state integer 
assignments and Table 6 shows PRC state integer assignments. Thus, the tuple <4,5> 
represents the instance where frequency is between 59.9 to 60.1 Hz and PRC is between 
2100 to 2300 MW. With seven states each, there are 49 possible observable tuples for 
each HMM state. 
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Table 5.   Frequency State Assignment. 
Frequency State Frequency Range 
0 Frequency <= 59.3 
1 59.3 < Frequency <= 59.5 
2 59.5 < Frequency <= 59.7 
3 59.7 < Frequency <= 59.9 
4 59.9 < Frequency <= 60.1 
5 60.1 < Frequency <= 60.3 
6 Frequency > 60.3 
Table 6.   PRC State Assignment. 
PRC State PRC Range 
0 PRC < 1354 
1 1354 <= PRC < 1500 
2 1500 <= PRC < 1700 
3 1700 <= PRC < 1900 
4 1900 <= PRC < 2100 
5 2100 <= PRC < 2300 
6 PRC >= 2300 
 
Using standard frequency analysis in conjunction with learning phase data, we 
generated Matrix A and Matrix B. Matrix A, represented as Table 7, provides the state 
transition properties for the HMM. Matrix B provides the probability of a given 
observable tuple O being observed in one of the four states: S, G, T, R. Table 8 represents 
part of Matrix B. 
Finally, for the purposes of this chapter, we assume that the initial state is always 
S. With all HMM parameters accounted for, pattern-detection follows the process 
illustrated in Figure 12 [17]. Power grid data flows into the HMM where a probability 
estimation algorithm runs on the current iteration. The HMM outputs the vector of 
symbols and associated probabilities then becomes the input into the pattern’s 
implementation code with the original power grid data. Pattern implementation code 
outputs a weighted version of a state-machine state change which can be used to conduct 
RV with existing formal specifications [17]. 
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Table 7.   Matrix A of HMM state transition probabilities. 
Transition 
Source/Target S G T R 
S 0.5533 0.0920 0.1540 0.2007 
G 0.5831 0.3607 0.0023 0.0539 
T 0.6263 0.0000 0.2981 0.0756 
R 0.6580 0.0016 0.0332 0.3072 
 
Table 8.   A portion of Matrix B, the probability of observation O  
in a HMM state. 
State S G T R 
<1,0> 0.0082 0.0000 0.0185 0.0239 
<1,1> 0.0037 0.0000 0.0057 0.0082 
<1,2> 0.0072 0.0011 0.0085 0.0185 
<1,3> 0.0131 0.0011 0.0178 0.0277 
<1,4> 0.0196 0.0229 0.0264 0.0555 
 
Figure 12.  Pattern matching architecture for power grid data and  
requirement 26 (after [17]). 
C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL 
This chapter described how the methodology presented in [17] to find hidden 
information within financial data can be applied to hidden data with an electric power 
grid. While we were not able to run the HMM and conduct RV using hidden data, the 
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sampled application of the learning phase and generation of HMM parameters shows how 
the methodology can be applied to an electric power grid. There are areas that need to be 
developed before the presented model is ready to be used reliably in a system. The first 
area is state granularity. In addition to breaking up existing partitions into smaller 
segments, granularity can also be improved by adding more applicable data to the tuple. 
An example of this would be adding a Boolean value of 1 to represent peak hours and 
switching it to 0 during non-peak hours. This distinction has the potential to add new 
insight and accuracy into Matrix B, resulting in a more usable HMM. 
The second area that needs to be developed moving forward is more lines of data 
generated in the learning phase. While a week’s worth of data served our purposes, more 
data and higher quality data is required to ensure the model is accurate and precise. This 
chapter has shown that the hybrid pattern detection technique proposed in [17] for hidden 
financial data can be potentially applied to an electric power grid system. 
 
  
 40
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We have demonstrated that formal specifications can be created to meet the spirit 
and letter of legitimate natural language requirements for a power grid. In doing so, the 
ambiguous nature of natural languages is negated. The purpose of this thesis is to lay the 
groundwork for detecting early bleak states by using bounded constraint solving. The 
intent behind identifying early bleak-states is to improve a mission-critical system’s 
reliability and stability. Even without conducting bounded constraint solving, formal 
specifications provide a reliable tool for an operator’s situational awareness. When used 
in conjunction, formal specifications and bounded constraint solving have the potential to 
significantly improve the dependability of mission-critical systems. The caveat is that 
research must be done to use the specifications from this thesis with the methodology 
from [1] to achieve the desired end-state of a more reliable system. 
The adaptation of the HMM methods used in [17] provides another means for 
improving the electric power grid in the future. Research to improve the granularity and 
increase the amount of data used in the learning phase from Chapter VI also ties into 
detecting bleak states. If formal specifications on hidden states can be efficiently used to 
validate and verify the power grid system, they can be added to the group of formal 
specifications used to conduct bounded constraint solving. 
Despite the accomplishments of this thesis, there are a few weakness and 
shortcomings. First and foremost, the specifications provided are not a comprehensive list 
of rules for the safe operation of an electric power grid. In reality, thousands of 
specifications, if not more, are required to achieve any level of assurance in such a 
complex system. Additionally, the 25 formal specifications in this thesis are focused on 
reliability and stability through several evaluations of system frequency and N-1 stability. 
While these are two important aspects, transient and voltage stability are also important 
criteria that were not included in the specifications.  
The final shortcoming of this thesis is that real-world power grid data was not 
used at any time during the generation or testing of the formal specifications. While 
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manually generated scenario data was vital for specification validation and testing, going 
forward it would have been beneficial to interface with real world data. Additionally, 
access to ERCOT’s data from the cold weather event in 2011 would have enabled us to 
evaluate the specifications responses to what happened and determine their practicality. 
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